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We reveal a security loophole in the current state-of-art phase reference pulse sharing scheme for 
Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution using a Local Local Oscillator (LLO-CVQKD). The 
loophole is associated with the amplitude of the phase reference pulses which Eve can manipulate to 
extract excess information which cannot be discovered by legitimate users. We call this new attack as 
the µUHIHUHQFHSXOVHDWWDFN¶.  We have demonstrated the efficiency of our attack for different LLO-
CVQKD transmission distances. Unity attack efficiency can be achieved at a transmission distance 
greater than 21.2 km in the case of a zero loss channel. The distance extends to 24.3 km where hollow-
core fibre channels are used. We also propose possible countermeasures.  
 
I. Introduction: 
The aim of quantum key distribution (QKD) is to 
promise information security between two authenticated 
users (Alice and Bob), connected by a classical channel 
and a quantum channel. This is achieved by sharing 
common random encryption codes which are unknown to 
the eavesdropper, Eve [1][2][3][4]. Continuous Variable 
(CV) QKD technology has rapidly developed in the recent 
years [5][6][7] and its protocols take advantage of the 
properties of light associated with waves, such as 
amplitude and phase, and encrypt keys in quadrature of the 
electromagnetic field which can be extracted with 
coherent detection techniques. The primary advantage of 
CVQKD is its compatibility with standard off-the-shelf 
optical communication components which could enable 
more affordable QKD networks [8]. In addition, compared 
with dedicated single-photon detector based discrete 
variable (DV) QKD systems, coherent detection allows 
CVQKD systems to have much higher potential key rates 
at short distance[9][10][11]. Furthermore, single optical 
integrated circuits are feasible [12] allowing CVQKD 
devices to be integrated with classical dense wavelength 
division multiplexing components [13]. A number of 
CVQKD protocols exist, but Gaussian-modulated 
coherent-state (GMCS) CVQKD having been rigorously 
studied and shown to provide unconditional security 
against malicious eavesdropping [14][15][16]. However, 
imperfections in real CVQKD systems result in potential 
loopholes that compromise the secure key generation. For 
example, attacks that exploit the intensity fluctuations of 
the local oscillator (LO) [17], the wavelength dependency 
of homodyne beam splitter [18], and the saturation of 
homodyne detector [19], have been identified and 
respective counter measures have been proposed. 
The Local Local Oscillator (LLO) CVQKD system, 
proposed and demonstrated in [20][21][22], obviates the 
need for direct transmission of a LO from Alice to Bob 
and thereby nullifies the scope for direct or indirect attacks 
on the LO. This is achieved by using independent narrow 
linewidth lasers of the same wavelength, one at Alice for 
signal generation and the other at Bob for local oscillator 
use. This scheme also facilitates the coexistence of 
CVQKD systems with classical coherent detection at high 
repetition rate [22]. However, agreeing a common phase 
reference between the two free running lasers is an 
experimental challenge. In order to ease such a limitation, 
Alice can share low intense phase reference pulses with 
Bob, and he can correct the LO laser phase in real time [23] 
or otherwise can adjust the measured quadrature outcomes 
later during data reconciliation [24]. Due to the relatively 
small signal magnitude, the quantum uncertainty 
associated with the phase of the reference pulse induces a 
SKDVHHVWLPDWLRQHUURULQ%RE¶VTXDGUDWXUHPHDVXUHPHQW 
and this amplitude-related noise can result in a loophole 
for Eve to mount an attack. This loophole has not been 
investigated in the security analysis of the LLO-CVQKD 
system to date and as a result, estimations of the derived 
secret key rate have been optimistic. In this paper, we 
propose an attack on the LLO-CVQKD system that 
exploits the phase estimation error associated with the 
amplitude of the phase reference pulses. The 
corresponding change in the estimation of noise is used to 
leave freedom for Eve to obtain a considerably larger 
amount of information than that estimated by Alice and 
Bob. We call this attack the ³UHIHUHQFH SXOVH DWWDFN´ 
(RPA). *sr734@cam.ac.uk 
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we 
briefly describe the LLO-CVQKD system under the 
GMCS protocol and demonstrate the phase noise and 
secret key analysis. In section III, we present the reference 
pulse attack model and explain the excess noise tolerance 
that Eve makes use of to increase the scale of the attack. 
More importantly, we revisit the expression for the mutual 
information analysis under the reference pulse attack. In 
section IV, we display the simulation results on excess 
noise tolerance and mutual information as a function of 
attenuation coefficient and transmission distance. And we 
show the attack efficiency and possible countermeasures. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn in section V.  
II The LLO CVQKD system 
In this section, we describe the implementation of the 
LLO-CVQKD system and the current state-of-art noise 
model where we focus on the phase noise, especially the 
phase estimation error noise, to reveal the loophole.  
A. Implementation principle 
As shown in Fig. 1, a practical LLO-CVQKD system 
using the GMCS protocol can be analysed in four parts: 
$OLFH¶VSUHSDUDWLRQFKDQQHOSURSDJDWLRQ%RE¶VGHWHFWLRQ
and post processing.  
First of all, Alice prepares a train of Gaussian 
modulated coherent states Ƚ୅ with quadrature D?஺ and D?஺ 
with varianceD?஺. Then, she transmits these coherent states 
to Bob through the quantum channel, which induces an 
arbitrary phase rotation on the signal pulses. In order to 
recover the initial phase of the signal, a phase reference 
pulse,Ƚ୅ୖ , of quadratureD?஺ோ  and D?஺ோ  is transmitted along 
each signal pulse. The intensity of the reference pulse is a 
few orders greater than the signal variance. It is of great 
importance that the reference pulse amplitude is not too 
large to limit signal-reference pulse interference. The 
quantum channel is characterized by the channel 
parameters: transmittance D? and excess noiseɌ associated 
with the action from a malicious eavesdropper, Eve.  
At Bob, quadrature of the signal and the reference 
pulses are measured with intense LO pulses using a shot-
noise limited heterodyne detector with an efficiency D?. 
Unlike the conventional CVQKD implementation, in the 
LLO-CVQKD system, a separate laser at Bob is applied 
to generate the LO. In order to robustly estimate the 
misalignment of the reference frames of the two free-
UXQQLQJ ODVHUV WKH PHDQ UHIHUHQFH SXOVHV¶ TXDGUDWXUH
values at Alice are publically announced.  The quadrature 
measurement outcomesD?஻ோ and D?஻ோ of the reference pulse 
are associated with estimated rotation angle, D?ோෞ , as given 
below:   
 D?஻ோ ൌ ඨD?D? ? ሺD?஺ோ  D?ோෞ ൅ D?஺ோ  D?ோෞ ሻ (1) 
 D?஻ோ ൌ ඨD?D? ? ሺെD?஺ோ  D?ோෞ ൅ D?஺ோ  D?ோෞ ሻ (2) 
The estimation can be calculated straightforwardly 
without losing generality by preparing the initial reference 
pulse with a zero phase angle (D?஺ோ ൌ  ?ሻ.  
 D?ோෞ ൌ  ିଵሺD?஻ோD?஻ோሻ (3) 
Consequently, the estimated phase angle is applied to 
rotate $OLFH¶V LQLWLDO VWDWH TXDGUDWXUH RU %RE¶V VWDWH
quadrature values.  This is followed by channel parameters 
estimation, error correction and privacy amplification.  
B. Phase noise estimation 
However, the phase rotation of the quantum signals 
cannot be completely corrected through the phase 
estimation of the reference pulse. As shown in Fig.2, the 
quantum signal phase rotation D?௦ ൌ D?ௌI?I?I?െ D?ௌI?I?I?I?I?I?is 
the phase difference between the quantum signal at Alice, D?ௌI?I?I?I?I?I?, and the local local oscillator, D?ௌI?I?I?, at Bob. 
When reference pulses are deployed to estimateD?௦ , the 
phase noise primarily originates from: (a) the phase drift 
due to the spectral linewidths, ǻȞA , of  the laser at Alice 
and ǻȞB  of the laser at Bob; and (b) the deviation of 
estimated phase value, D?ோෞ  , of the reference pulse from the 
exact phase values D?ோ. 
Since the relative phase drift between two free running 
lasers can be modelled as a Gaussian stochastic process, 
centred at the central frequency, the variance of this phase 
drift at the time interval between quantum and reference 
pulses can be estimated from: D?ௗ௥௜௙௧ ൌ   ?D?ሺ ?D?஺ ൅  ?D?஻ሻD?௥௘௣  (4) 
 
Fig.1 Practical LLO-CVQKD setup. The signal pulse (blue) 
and phase reference pulse (green) are transmitted through the 
optical channel and encounter same attenuation. At Bob, the 
received signals are interfered with the LO (black) to extract 
quadrature values.  
where D?௥௘௣  is the repetition rate of the system.   
Similarly, one can find the uncertainty, Verror, 
associated with the measured and the exact phase of the 
reference pulse, which is inversely proportional to the 
amplitude ERef of the reference pulse [24]. This is 
primarily due to the fundamental shot noise and total 
noiseD?௧ , and can be written as [21][24]: D?௘௥௥௢௥ ൌ D?D?D?ሺD?ோෞ െ D?ோሻ ൌ ሺI?I?ାଵሻாI?I?I?I?   (5) 
Both these uncertainties, Vdrift and Verror , contribute to 
the PLVDOLJQPHQW EHWZHHQ $OLFH DQG %RE¶V reference 
frames and  results in a total phase excess noise D?௣௛௔௦௘ , 
which  can be derived from ref. [20][21] as:  D?௣௛௔௦௘ ൎ D?஺ B? D?௣௛௔௦௘ (6) ൌ D?஺ B? ሺ ? ൅ D?௧ D?ோ௘௙ଶ ൅  ?D? ?D?஺ ൅  ?D?஻D?௥௘௣ ሻ  
Therefore, the phase excess noise is contributed form 
two parts: the former term is phase estimation error noise D?௘௥௥௢௥and the last term is drift noise D?ௗ௥௜௙௧ . The total 
excess noise D?௧  to favour easy understanding of our 
proposed attack, is therefore expressed as: D?௧ ൌ D?௘ ൅ D?௣௛௔௦௘ (7) 
where D?௘  comes IURP (YH¶V quantum signal  interfering 
actions and other noises attributed to her account. Using 
the linear Gaussian model, the quadrature values 
measured by Bob is written as: 
 ቆD?஻෢D?஻෢ቇ ൌ ඨD?D? ? ቈ൬  D?ோෞ  D?ோෞെ  D?ோෞ  D?ோෞ ൰ ൬D?஺D?஺ ൰ ൅ ቆD?௘௫ ൅ D?௘௣ ൅ ቇ቉൅ ൬D?௘௟௘D?௘௟௘൰ 
 (8) 
୒  and ୒  are vacuum quadratures with unit shot noise 
variance ( D?଴ ). D?௘௟௘  and D?௘௟௘  are electronic noise 
quadratures with varianceD?௘௟௘ . In the above equation Eq. 
(8), the rotation matrix in the first term accounts the phase 
estimation error while the D?௘௫ and D?௘௣ represent the noise 
GXHWR(YH¶VDWWDFN  
C. Secret key analysis  
The secret key formula pertaining to the LLO-CVQKD 
scheme follows exactly that for a conventional CVQKD 
scheme. Under a collective attack [3] with reverse 
reconciliation, the key rate is: 
 D?௖௢௟௟௘௖௧௜௩௘ ൌ D?D?஺஻ െ D?஻ா  (9) 
Where D? is the reconciliation efficiency and D?஺஻  is the 
mutual information between Alice and Bob while D?஻ா is WKH XSSHU ERXQG RI (YH¶V LQIRUPDWLRQ UHODWHG WR WKH
Holevo bound [25]. From the Shannon equation, D?஺஻  with 
heterodyne detection can be derived through: 
 
୅୆ ൌ ଶ D?஻D?஻ȁ஺ ൌ ଶ D? ൅ D?௧ ? ൅ D?௧  (10) 
Here, the total added noise ɖ୲referred to the input (at 
Alice) includes the channel D?௟௜௡௘  and the heterodyne 
detection noise ɖ୦ୣ୲ with included electronics noise.  D?௟௜௡௘ ൌ  ?D?െ  ? ൅ Ɍ୲ (11) ɖ୦ୣ୲ ൌ ሾ ? ൅ሺ ? െ D?ሻ ൅  ?D?௘௟௘ሿD?  (12) D?௧ ൌ D?௟௜௡௘ ൅ D?௛௘௧D?   (13) 
Furthermore, the accessed information by Eve ɖ୆୉  is 
evaluated using the Von Neumann entropy S(.)[26]: 
 ɖ୆୉ ൌ D?ሺD?ሻ െ D?ሺD?ȁD?ሻ (14) 
For the GMCS protocol, the entropy is analysed using 
the symplectic eigenvalues [27] of covariance matrixD?. 
Therefore, based on the formula given in [20][28], the 
general mutual information between Eve and Bob is: 
 ɖ୆୉ ൌ ෍ D? ൬D?௜ െ  ? ? ൰ ൅ ෍ D? ൬D?௜ െ  ? ? ൰ହ௜ୀଷ ଶ௜ୀଵ  (15) 
where 
ሺሻ ൌ ሺ ൅  ?ሻ ଶሺ ൅  ?ሻ െ ଶ and the 
eigenvalues ɉଵǡଶ ൌ ටଵଶ ൫D? േ ?D?ଶ െ  ?D?൯ with   ൌ D?ଶሺ ? െ  ?D?ሻ ൅  ?D? ൅ D?ଶሺD? ൅ D?௟௜௡௘ሻଶ (16) 
 
Fig.2 The general process of phase rotation and estimation. At 
Bob, the actual relative phase, G?D?,(blue angle) of the quantum 
signal (1,3) and estimated relative phase E?E?ෞ  (green angle) from 
reference pulse (2,4) are added to initial phase. E?E?ෞ  is used to 
estimate phase difference  G?D? between two free-running lasers. 
 ൌ ሾሺɖ୪୧୬ୣ ൅  ?ሻሿଶ (17) 
Considering that heterodyne detection, ɉଷǡସǡହ  can be 
expressed by ɉଷǡସ ൌ ටଵଶ ൫D? േ ?D?ଶ െ  ?D?൯  and ɉହ ൌ  ? 
with  ൌ ଵ൫்ሺ௏ାI?I?ሻ൯I?ቂD?D?௛௘௧ଶ ൅ D? ൅  ? ൅  ?D?௛௘௧ ቀD? ?D?൅ D?ሺD? ൅D?௟௜௡௘ሻቁ ൅  ?D?ሺD?ଶ െ  ?ሻቃ(18)
 ൌ ቆ ൅  ?D?௛௘௧D?ሺD? ൅ D?௧ሻ ቇଶ (19) 
After analytically reviewing the current LLO-CVQKD 
system, the novel attack on this system is discovered and 
explained in following section. 
 III Reference pulse attack  
A. Reference pulse attack model  
In CVQKD, the parameter estimation procedure allows 
Alice to estimate only the overall excess noise value, Ɍ୲ǡ as 
a single estimated value, of which contributions from 
several individual noise sources are practically impossible 
to distinguish. As a consequence, the variation in the noise 
contribution from individual noise sources cannot be 
detected if the overall excess noise is kept unchanged. We 
will exploit this vulnerability to facilitate the reference 
pulse attack.  
  The fundamental plan of the reference pulse attack is 
to manipulate individual excess noise contributions 
without altering the overall excess noiseD?௧ . The attack 
works as follows. Eve attacks on the quantum signal 
pulses, which inevitably increases the overall excess noise. 
However, at the same time, she decreases the phase 
estimation error noiseD?௘௥௥௢௥, that is associated with the 
amplitude of the reference pulse, by an equivalent amount. 
Therefore, the total excess noise calculated by Eq. (7), 
remains unchanged.  As a result, the overall excess noise 
estimated by Alice and Bob does not increase with 
additional attacks while extra information is successfully 
accessed by Eve without being realised.  
Without loss of generality, we consider the reference 
pulse attack based on a typical fiber optic implementation 
of LLO-CVQKD system [20][21] as the schematic 
diagram shown in Fig.3.  Let D? and D?௧be the estimated 
signal channel parameters which are used in Eq. (11) - Eq. 
(19) in order to estimate the D?஺஻  -mutual information 
between Alice and Bob, and the D?஻ா  -information 
acquired by Eve. 
The reference pulse attack happens during the 
transmission of the pulses though the channel. After the 
quantum signals and the reference pulses are sent to the 
channel, at the output of Alice, Eve distinguishes and 
separates them into two individual channels. All quantum 
signals are transmitted through standard single mode fibre 
(SMF) with an attenuation factorȽୱ୲ୢ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?Ȁ, while 
the reference pulses are transmitted through low loss 
channel of attenuation coefficientD?௟௢௪ ൏ D?௦௧ௗ .D?௟௢௪  = 0 
for zero loss (vacuum) channel while D?௟௢௪  = 0.14dB/km 
is currently achievable with hollow-core fibres [29]. At the 
input of Bob, Eve recombines the pulses into single SMF 
channel.  
In addition to separating the signal and reference pulses 
and then recombining them, Eve also performs another 
simultaneous task.  She increase her amount of attack on 
the signal pulses and gains more information. This will, 
however, increase the excess noise D?௘  by D?௘ோ௉஺    which 
might be detected by the users as it results in an elevation 
in total excess noise  D?௧ to  D?௧ோ௉஺ (Eq. (7)). As a consequence, 
this will lead to the estimation of new Holelvo bound for 
(YH¶VLQIRUPDWLRQD?஻ா௔௖௧௨௔௟, by Alice and Bob. But, since the 
reference pulses propagate through low loss channel and 
reach Bob at an elevated amplitude, as we can see from 
Eq. (6), it will reduce the noise associated with phase 
estimation error noise. The noise increase in total excess 
noise is thus compensated, and Alice and Bob estimate 
after overall attack process D?஻ாோ௉஺  instead of D?஻ா௔௖௧௨௔௟ , hence 
XQGHUHVWLPDWH(YH¶VLQIRUPDWLRQ 
The additional amount of the information that Eve can 
steal without increasing total excess noise is, of course, 
limited by the channel loss of the reference pulses. We will 
quantify this in the following subsection. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.3 Reference pulse attack schematic diagram. At the output 
of Alice, Eve selectively switches the reference pulse to the 
low loss channel (blue) and the quantum pulse to the normal 
SMF fibre (red). She recombines the pulses at the input of Bob. 
The dashed green lines shows the less-attenuated path 
reference pulses.  
B. Excess noise tolerance   
For the success of the attack, the elevation in excess 
noise due to the attack on the signal must be compensated 
by simultaneous reduction in the phase excess noise. This 
requires the estimation of noise margin available to Eve 
from the reduction of phase estimation error noise that is 
associated with the amplitude of the reference pulse. From 
the Eq. (6), the reduced phase estimation error noise  D?௘௥௥௢௥௟௢௪  can be evaluated as: 
 D?௘௥௥௢௥௟௢௪ ൌ D?஺ B? D?௧ ൅  ?D? B? D?௟௢௪D? B? D?௦௧ௗ D?ோ௘௙ଶ ൌ D?௘௥௥௢௥௦௧ௗ B?D?௦௧ௗD?௟௢௪ (20) 
where, D?௦௧ௗ  is the transmittance of SMF fibre with 
attenuation coefficient D?௦௧ௗ  = 0.2dB/km and D?௟௢௪  is 
transmittance of the low loss reference pulse channel with 
attenuation coefficient D?௟௢௪  < D?௡ . The available phase 
excess noise tolerance that Eve can account for by the 
attack can be evaluated as:  D?௧௢௟௘ ൌ D?௘௥௥௢௥௦௧ௗ െ D?௘௥௥௢௥௟௢௪  ൌ D?஺ B?I?I?ାଵாI?I?I?I? B? ሺ ? െ ଵଵ଴ሺഀI?I?I?I?ഀI?I?I?ሻB?I?I?I? ሻ  
 (21) 
Here, we assume the length L of the quantum channel 
and reference channel are equal. Based on the value D?௟௢௪   
of the reference channel and channel length L, Eve can 
increase her attack until the additional excess noise D?௘ோ௉஺   
equalsD?௧௢௟௘ . Hence the resultant phase noise is unchanged. 
Under the scope of reference pulse attack, we can rewrite 
Eq. (7) as: D?௧D?D?D?D?ൌ D?௘ ൅ D?௘ோ௉஺ ൅ D?௣௛௔௦௘െD?௧௢௟௘         (22) 
As explained earlier, the first two noise terms (D?௘ ൅D?௘ோ௉஺) are DWWULEXWHGWR(YH¶VDWWDFNRQWKHsignal while the 
last two terms (D?௣௛௔௦௘െD?௧௢௟௘) represent the phase noise 
linked to the reference pulse. Under the reference pulse 
attack, the quadrature values measured by Bob, Eq. (10) 
can be rewritten as: 
൭D?஻ோ௉஺෣D?஻ோ௉஺෣ ൱ ൌ ඨD?D? ? ቈ൬  D?ோ௉஺ෟ  D?ோ௉஺ෟെ  D?ோ௉஺ෟ   D?ோ௉஺ෟ ൰ ൬D?஺D?஺ ൰൅ ቆD?௘௫ ൅ D?௔ௗௗ ൅ D?௘௣ ൅ D?௔ௗௗ ൅ ቇ቉ ൅ ൬D?௘௟௘D?௘௟௘൰ 
 (23) 
Under the reference pulse attack, the phase estimator D?D?D?D? is more accurate and lowers the phase estimation 
error noise while additional excess noise induced on the 
signal by Eve keeps the measured quadrature values 
unchanged. In the following section, ZH HVWLPDWH (YH¶V
gain in information during the attack.  
C. Secret key analysis  under attack 
In this section, a comparison of the mutual information 
and +ROHYRERXQG IRU(YH¶VJDLQ before ( D?஺஻  and D?஻ா ) 
and after the attack ( D?஺஻ோ௉஺   and D?஻ாோ௉஺  ) are considered. 
Based on eq. (22), the total noise estimated by Alice and 
Bob after attack, D?௧ோ௉஺ǡ  is identical to the µno¶ attack 
situationɖ୲. This indicates that the attack, as in Eq. (10), 
does not affect the mutual information between Alice and 
Bob which can be referred to as: 
 ୅୆ ൌ ଶ D? ൅ D?௧ ? ൅ D?௧ ൌ ଶ D? ൅ D?௧ோ௉஺ ? ൅ D?௧ோ௉஺ ൌ ୅୆ோ௉஺ (24) 
Similarly, the HROHYR ERXQG IRU (YH¶V LQIRUPDWLRQ
estimated by Alice and Bob is unchanged, as long as the 
total noise remains the same, ie D?஻ா  =D?஻ாோ௉஺. However, the 
actual information obtained by Eve D?஻ா௔௖௧௨௔௟ is greater than D?஻ா  due to her additional signal extraction actions whose 
excess noise is compensated by the phase noise reduction. 
An easy and straight forward way to estimate D?஻ா௔௖௧௨௔௟  is to 
consider the total noise without phase noise reduction in 
Eq. (22), i.e.,D?௧௔௖௧௨௔௟ ൌ D?௘ ൅ D?௘ோ௉஺ ൅ D?௣௛௔௦௘.  By following 
the exact procedure, from Eq. (11) to Eq. (19) we can 
estimate and find that  D?஻ா௔௖௧௨௔௟  > D?஻ா  . We define the 
efficiency of the reference pulse attack as the ratio of the 
information leaked to Eve with and without attack: D?௘௙௙ ൌ D?஻ாD?D㼇?D?D?D?െ ɖ୆୉D?஺஻ െ ɖ୆୉  (25) 
The following section reports the results of the phase 
noise reduction and attack efficiency under different LLO-
QKD system conditions. 
IV attack performance analysis 
We investigate the attack performance as a function of 
various reference channel attenuation factors, D?௟௢௪ ǡ 
ranging from the vacuum channel (0dB/km) to 
conventional SMF (0.2dB/km). We also consider a 
practical scenario where the reference channel uses 
recently reported hollow-core fibres of 0.1419dB/km 
attenuation coefficient. The simulation parameters are 
selected to match the parameters used in recent LLO-
CVQKD experiments [20][22], which are: variance of 
$OLFH¶V PRGXODWLRQ VA =4, the efficiency of the 
reconciliation process D? ൌ  ?Ǥ  ? , the detector 
efficiency D? ൌ  ?Ǥ ?, the signal path fibre attenuation 
coefficient D?௦௧ௗ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?D?D?ȀD?D?, the electronic noise 
D?௘௟௘௖ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?, the original system  excess noise D?௘ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?,    
the receiver repetition rate D?௥௘௣ ൌ  ? ? ?D?D?D?, laser 
linewidth ȟD? ൌ  ?Ǥ ?D?D⨇? and the realistic reference pulse 
amplitude D?ோ   which is chosen as ଶୖȀ୅ ൌ  ? ? ?. Values 
are expressed in shot noise unit. 
Fig. 4 shows the variation in phase excess noise 
tolerance (Eq. (21)) with different attenuation coefficients 
of the reference channel for a 20km LLO-CVQKD link. It 
can be seen that, the phase noise reduces by 58% and 23% 
of the initial value for zero loss and hollow core fibre 
reference channel respectively.  
The actual and estimated mutual information between 
Alice and Bob and the Holevo bound for (YH¶V
information are shown in Fig.5 for different values of 
reference path attenuation coefficients, D?௟௢௪ ǡ for a 20km 
channel length. ୅୆ (black dashed line) is independent of 
the attack. A region (light red area) appears between actual 
Eve accessed information D?஻ா ?D?D㼇?D?D?D? (blue dashed line) and 
the estimated value D?஻ாD?D?D?(red dashed line) after overall 
process, which  is referred to as the attack-induced 
insecure region. The ɖ୆୉ோ௉஺  is independent of D?௟௢௪ . The 
truly secure region (blue area) is secure under the attack.  
In this case, for a 20 km distance and for 0dB/km 
attenuation coefficient, Eve can extract 79% of the secret 
key without being found. For a feasible 0.14dB/km 
attenuation coefficient, Eve can achieve 37% information 
extraction from original secure key region.  
Fig. 6 shows the mutual information variation as a 
function of transmission distance D?. Rather than for a 
range of attenuation factors, the D?஻ா௔௖௧௨௔௟  values are only 
evaluated for D?௟௢௪ ൌ   ?D?D?ȀD?D? (blue dashed line) and 
 ?Ǥ ? ?D?D?ȀD?D? (red dashed line). The HVWLPDWHG (YH¶V
information from Alice and Bob after the overall 
attack, D?஻ாோ௉஺, is evaluated at a reference path attenuation 
coefficient  D?௦௧ௗ ൌ   ?Ǥ ?D?D?ȀD?D? (purple solid line). The 
mutual information between Alice and Bob, ୅୆  (black 
solid line), monotonically decreases as a function of 
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Fig. 4 Phase noise with (blue dashed line) and without (red 
dashed line) attack variation at different reference path 
attenuation coefficient. Considerable excess noise tolerance 
is generated by attack. Simulations are performed in the 
collective attack and ୅=4, ଶୖ Ȁ୅ ൌ  ? ? ?and ൌ  ? ?.  
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Fig.5 Mutual information variations for different reference 
path attenuation coefficients. Simulations are performed for 
collective attack, with ୅=4, ଶୖ Ȁ୅ ൌ  ? ? ? and  ൌ  ? ?. 
The excess information obtained by Eve is shown in red 
region. 
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Fig. 6 Mutual information vs channel lengths. Insecure region 
expands with increase in transmission distance.  Zero-loss 
(vacuum) channel maximize the information gain by Eve. 
Simulations are performed in the collective attack and the ୅=4, ଶୖ Ȁ୅ ൌ  ? ? ? 
channel length. The secure region under attack is labelled 
as the truly secure region while the yellow region is the 
insecure region estimated by Alice and Bob with or 
without attack.  The white region referred as the attack 
induced insecure region indicating that secret keys are 
being successfully obtained by Eve without being detected. 
The attack-induced insecure key region broadens as the 
signal transmission distance increases. This result shows 
the mounting disparity between the quantum channel and 
the reference channel loss.  
At a relatively long distance, the unsecured key ratio 
grows rapidly which indicates an increase in attack 
efficiency. We need to emphasize that the exact D?௘௙௙ value 
varies with system parameters and a 100% insecure key 
situation can be achieved especially at long transmission 
distance.  For example, from Fig.7, it can be seen, for D?௟௢௪  
= 0dB/km, the attack efficiency, D?௘௙௙ becomes 100% at a 
quantum channel distance around 21.2 km. While 
considering the realistic value of Įlow =0.14dB/km, D?௘௙௙ 
reaches 100% at 24.3 km, above which no security can be 
promised. The null key distance for a standard SMF 
channel is 27.6km for the given set of system parameters.  
We propose plausible countermeasures in order to 
detect the reference pulse attack. Bob can monitor the 
instantaneous amplitude of the reference pulse and 
compare it with the value at the output of Alice. If the ratio 
has a large disparity with ඥୱ୲ୢ - obtained from parameter 
estimation of the signal, Alice and Bob can simply stop 
communication. Otherwise, we may could recalculate the 
upper bound of D?஻ா  by including tolerable phase 
noise, D?௧௢௟௘ , Eq. (21).  This would guarantee the fully 
trusted key under reference pulse attack. A rigorous 
countermeasure analysis will follow this paper. 
V Conclusion  
In this paper, we have, for the first time, revealed a 
security threat in a LLO-CVQKD system arising from the 
quantum uncertainty of reference pulses which is 
employed as pilot signals to estimate phase noise between 
two free-running lasers. We have proposed a novel attack 
on the LLO-CVQKD system, named as the reference 
pulse attack. This comprises of two simultaneous tasks: (a) 
where Eve selectively switches reference pulse to low loss 
channel; and (b) attacks the quantum signals. We have 
shown that the phase estimation error noise can be tuned 
by adjusting the reference channel attenuation coefficient 
which provides Eve with an excess noise tolerance to 
acquire extra information from the quantum signals. More 
importantly, this estimation error exists in all reference 
pulse protocols so that the loophole could affect all of the 
LLO-CVQKD system configurations. Our proposed 
attack breaks the immunity of LLO-CVQKD that 
originally has been proposed to defend the attack on local 
oscillator. It should be noted that with a relatively larger 
reference pulse amplitude the efficiency of the attack 
would be much lower than that obtained in this paper. 
However, in general, the current implementation of LLO-
CVQKD systems are vulnerable to the reference pulse 
attack.  
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